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This article begins with the analogy between work in philosophy and work in architecture proposed by
Wittgenstein, based on the idea that in both cases we are faced with work on ourselves and on the construction of
our own identity and general understanding.
This initial idea is developed by explaining how all project-based concern requires first and foremost the raising of
one’s internal resources to a level of competence and knowledge that puts the subject in a position to tangibly
handle the problems the project entails.
On the grounds of further conviction that the project should always be nurtured both on concern for change/
inclination towards seeing and thinking differently, therefore “sense of possibility”, and on capacity for rooting,
namely sense of reality, reference is made to the “Triadic System of Rooting and Projection (TSRP)”. This is a
perceptive and cognitive nucleus guaranteed by three different processing systems: ecological intelligence (the
motor-perceptive system and devices linked with the representation of space); social intelligence (the mind’s
system of reading applied to the construction of a space shared with other organisms); finally, temporal intelligence
(the capacity to travel in time on which the construction of the experiential continuity of individuals is based).
Though they process very different types of information, these three cognitive systems converge on the capacity to
detach the organism from the current situation and project it into alternative situations in time, space and the
social environment.
Following a specific analysis of the first two systems, we dwell on the different components of temporal
intelligence, proposing a new interpretation of the articulate concept of time we inherited from Greek culture, with
the purpose of understanding which idea of time is the most suitable for us to understand the speed of innovation
nowadays and thus to support project-oriented culture in line with the requirements of our times.
The article ends with a detailed analysis of the three stages that characterise visual perception, as proposed by the
results neuroscience has achieved, with the aim of deepening the contribution that deduction, induction and
abduction, as unique “instruments for thinking”, must provide for project-oriented work.“As is frequently the case with work in architecture, work
on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On
one’s own understanding. On the way one sees things.
(And on what one demands of them.)” L. Wittgenstein,
The Big Typescript: TS (Wittgenstein, 2002).
213 German-English Scholars’ Edition, edited and
translated by C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E.
Aue, Wiley-Blackwell (2005), Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
Oxford, UK.
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in any medium, provided the original work is pour “gaze strategy”, which profoundly affects our way of
perceiving and experiencing the environment we live in.
This strategy is often the product of a unilateral type of
sight and of bias that works like the old Indian monkey-
trap Pirsig spoke of: “The trap consists of a coconut
shell chained to a fence. It contains rice that can be
taken through a hole. The opening is big enough for a
monkey to get its hand in, but too small for it to get it
out full of rice. The monkey puts its hand in and finds it
trapped – solely due to the inflexibility of its values. It
cannot change the value of the rice. It cannot manage to
see that freedom without rice is worth more than cap-
ture with it” (Pirsig, 1981, p. 301).
What acts as “rice” in the case in point is a vision of
the future unfit to accommodate the deep sense of
change we are experiencing and the radical innovationsan Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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the fundamental issue of time and our relationship with
it and is the fruit of our inability to realise that, today
more than ever, the past may certainly provide us with
instructive, emblematic cases but not answers and effect-
ive remedies since exact repeatability just does not exist.
This theme is at the heart of a challenging book by
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, entitled, not by chance, The
Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable, in
which the author poses the problem of the growing
difficulty of imagining a future that has not been extrap-
olated from the present, a projection of today on tomor-
row, which we consider - precisely because it is thought
of in this way - can be coped with by referring back to
the same prevalent, hegemonic conceptual pictures of
the moment (Taleb 2008). If we follow this path we will
actually only achieve “learning backwards”, accepting
that we can and should do without any reference to the
unusual and the “unpredictable” for they “cannot be ex-
trapolated” and are therefore “not normal” by definition.
Those who follow an approach like this are not able to
imagine a future without an “algorithmic” face - the re-
sult of a regular succession and spontaneous projection
of the “before” on the “after” - whereas it should be con-
ceived as “life to come”, loaded with unpredictability so
full of risks, but also of hopes and opportunities.
The idea of a “project-oriented” person should be con-
trasted with Pirsig’s monkey, a person convinced that it is
up to man’s action to proactively and effectively “weave”
the various threads that make up his existence in the
world, and that man should therefore constantly be com-
mitted to producing a constructive capacity that will allow
him to tackle the challenges of the present and near future
in ways and shapes that match up to what is at stake.
This type of person is portrayed well by Perseus, the
mythological hero of whom Italo Calvino gives us a
powerful description in an essay belonging to the
American Lessons he would have given at Harvard in
the 1985/86 academic year, if he had not suffered a
stroke in September 1985 on the eve of his departure
for the United States (Calvino, 2002).
In the first of these lessons, devoted to Lightness, the
author reflects on the meaning of Medusa’s inexorable
stare that turns every aspect of life to stone – and can
therefore be considered an effective representation of
the inertia of reality and its resistance to every effort and
attempt to change it – and on the way of getting round
it and fighting it:
“The only hero able to cut off Medusa’s head is Perseus,
who flies with winged sandals; Perseus, who does not turn
his gaze upon the face of the Gorgon but only upon her
image reflected in his bronze shield. […] To cut off
Medusa’s head without being turned to stone, Perseus sup-
ports himself on the very lightest of things, the winds andthe clouds, and fixes his gaze upon what can be revealed
only by indirect vision, an image caught in a mirror” (Six
Memos for the Next Millennium, 2008, p. 12).
So in order to oppose the petrification process of real-
ity we need to make use of the resources of lightness
and at the same time benefit from the advantage of
“indirect vision”, which enables us to look at what sur-
rounds us through a mirror image. This dual reference
to lightness and the mirror image has a clear-cut mean-
ing. Aristotle adopts lightness both in his Physics and De
Anima as a principle of movement in natural bodies, in
that it is form and nature, namely formal cause and na-
ture (Aristotele, 2012). To form, living” form in particu-
lar, is attributed motor causality, a certain type of
δύναμις, an internal capacity found only in the living
and specifically in man, in whom the soul is both form
and at the same time principle of movement.
As far as the mirror is concerned, apart from creating
the imaginary, Lacan considers it the fundamental instru-
ment of the identification process. The expression “mirror
stage” is in fact used in evolutionary psychology with a La-
canian matrix to indicate the cognitive process within the
range of six to eighteen months of age in which the child
manages to recognise the image he sees in the mirror as
his own. If placed in front of a mirror, a child first reacts
with a sense of alienation, as if he were able to interact
with the image he sees; only later will he realise the im-
aginary status of that vision. Finally, he will reach the
point of understanding that what he sees is not just an
image but his own image (Lacan, 1974, pp. 89 et seq.).
So it is through the image the mirror yields that, in an
initial phase, the moment of transformation of the sub-
ject takes place; thanks indeed to the image identifying
him, in which he recognises himself and what belongs to
him, distinguishing himself from the surrounding world,
the subject becomes aware of his own reality and nature.
The dual reference to lightness and the specular image
in the myth of Perseus therefore means that Medusa,
hence heaviness and resistance to reality, may success-
fully be fought only by filtering a solid self-awareness. A
prerequisite of the capacity to intervene in the environ-
ment in which one lives and modify it is therefore the
enhancement of the self as a person, the raising of one’s
internal resources to a level of competence and know-
ledge that, as well as giving solid awareness, puts the
subject in a position to tangibly handle the problems
each project entails.
Perseus’s strength, Calvino continues, and his struggle
against Medusa do not, however, turn into “a refusal of
the reality in which he is fated to live; he carries the real-
ity with him…” (Calvino, 2012).
In fact the myth tells us that:
“The relationship between Perseus and the Gorgon is
a complex one and does not end with the beheading of
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horse, Pegasus – the heaviness of stone is transformed
into its opposite. […] As for the severed head, Perseus
does not abandon it but carries it concealed in a bag.
When his enemies are about to overcome him, he has
only to display it, holding it by its snaky locks, and this
bloodstained booty becomes an invincible weapon in the
hero’s hand. It is a weapon he uses only in cases of dire
necessity, and only against those who deserve the pun-
ishment of being turned into statues. Here, certainly, the
myth is telling us something, something implicit in the
images that can’t be explained in any other way. Perseus
succeeds in mastering that horrendous face by keeping it
hidden, just as in the first place he vanquished it by
viewing it in a mirror. Perseus’s strength always lies in a
refusal to look directly, but not in a refusal of the reality
in which he is fated to live; he carries the reality with
him and accepts it as his particular burden” (Six Memos
for the Next Millennium, 2008, p. 12-13).
When read in this key the myth tells us however
that design has to be nurtured both on concern for
change/inclination towards seeing and thinking differ-
ently, therefore “sense of possibility”, and on capacity for
rooting, namely sense of reality. To understand how this
co-existence may tangibly be created, reference is made
to the process of “contextually bound flexibility”, the
mechanism of which we are nowadays beginning to
understand fully, also from the biological and evolution-
ary points of view. It involves two basic abilities usually
shown in intelligent behaviour: the capacity to “anchor”
oneself to the context (the function that strongly roots
the organism in the contextual situation) and the cap-
acity to “project” oneself from the current context into a
different one (the function able to detach or dissociate
the organism from the here and now of the present situ-
ation). Rooting and projection constitute the basic func-
tions of flexibly adequate behaviour and therefore also of
successful design.
Let us revert to Calvino, who continues as follows:
“On the relationship between Perseus and Medusa, we
can learn something more from Ovid’s Metamorphoses
(Calvino, 2012). Perseus wins another battle: he hacks a
sea-monster to pieces with his sword and sets Androm-
eda free. Now he prepares to do what any of us would
do after such an awful chore – he wants to wash his
hands. But another problem arises: where to put Me-
dusa’s head. And here Ovid has some lines (IV. 740-752)
that seem to me extraordinary in showing how much
delicacy of spirit a man must have to be a Perseus, the
killer of monsters: “So that the rough sand should not
harm the snake-haired head, he makes the ground soft
with a bed of leaves, and on top of that he strews little
branches of plants born under water, and on this he
places Medusa’s head, face down”. I think that thelightness, of which Perseus is the hero, could not be bet-
ter represented than by this gesture of refreshing cour-
tesy toward a being so monstrous and terrifying yet at
the same time somehow fragile and perishable. But the
most unexpected thing is the miracle that follows: when
they touch Medusa, the little marine plants turn to coral
and the nymphs, in order to have coral for adornments,
rush to bring sprigs and seaweed to the terrible head”
(Six Memos for the Next Millennium, 2008, p. 13).
Now, the respect for reality and “kindness” towards it,
even when our desire for change makes it revocable, is
nevertheless fragile; not only is it not a hindrance to
transformation and change but on the contrary consti-
tutes the indispensable prerequisite.
This necessary complementarity between sense of real-
ity and sense of possibility is assured by what is called
the “Triadic System of Rooting and Projection” (TSRP),
in its turn “guaranteed by three different processing sys-
tems: ecological intelligence (the motor-perceptive sys-
tem and devices linked with the representation of space);
social intelligence (the mind’s system of reading applied
to the construction of a space shared with other organ-
isms); finally, temporal intelligence (the capacity to travel
in time on which the construction of the experiential
continuity of individuals is based” (Ferretti, 2009, p. 87).
Though they process very different types of informa-
tion, the three cognitive systems in question converge
on the capacity to detach the organism from the current
situation and project it into alternative situations in
space, time and the social environment. This conver-
gence is witnessed by the joint operation of the subcom-
ponents involved in various cognitive tasks: the capacity to
represent space is very often linked with the capacity to
represent time; the capacity to “look at the world with the
eyes of others” also necessarily entails spatial dislocation.
Given their effects on project-oriented capacity, it is
worth analysing these three cognitive systems in depth
and separately.
Ecological intelligence
The findings of research on the structure and function-
ing of some cerebral processes and circuits are increas-
ingly eroding away the credibility of the classical pattern
of perception⇒ cognition⇒movement, which has now
entered an irresolvable crisis due to recognition of the
fact that perception appears to be immersed in the dy-
namics of action and consequently proves much more
articulate and composite than it was shown to be in the
past. This conclusion was reached thanks to research
highlighting that the motor system is by no means per-
ipheral and isolated from the rest of cerebral activity.
On the contrary, it consists of a complex weft of areas
differentiated in terms of location and functions, and
able to provide a decisive contribution to achieving
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viduation/location of objects and activation of move-
ments depend that are required by most of the acts and
behaviour comprising our daily experience. “And this is
not all: the fact that sensory and motor information can
be traced back to a common format, coded by specific
parieto-frontal circuits, suggests that as well as organis-
ing our motor behaviour, certain processes usually con-
sidered of a higher order and attributed to systems of a
cognitive type, such as, for example, the perception and
recognition of others’ acts, imitation and even forms of
communication by gestures and voice, may also refer
back to the motor system and find their primary neural
substrate in it” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2006, p. 22).
In this extremely interesting general picture are included
the results achieved by a research group at the University
of Parma under Giacomo Rizzolatti, an avant-garde
scholar in the experimental neurophysiology sector, which
led to the discovery of “mirror neurons” – so-called since
they permit a form of mirroring between perception and
action – in the F5 area of the ventral premotor cortex of
the macaque monkey, considered homologous with the
Broca area in humans, meaning that it may be interpreted
as an evolution of the F5 area of monkeys.
This discovery strengthens the idea that the recogni-
tion of objects is entrusted to a “pragmatic” representa-
tion (the fact that an object can be grasped in a certain
way) rather than a semantic representation of reality.
From this viewpoint, therefore, seeing occurs that is not
an end in itself but directed towards steering the hand,
and consequently presents itself “also, if not above all, as
seeing with the hand, with respect to which the object
perceived appears immediately to be coded as a specific
set of hypotheses for action” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
2006, p. 49).
Perception, therefore, reveals itself as an implicit prep-
aration of the body to respond and act, and a type of
understanding springs from it whose nature is in fact
eminently pragmatic and does not in itself determine
any “semantic” representation of the object. Rather than
being, for example, identified and recognised on the
grounds of its form, meaning or function, in a word its
belonging to an already classified, coded set, the said ob-
ject would therefore be perceived and recognised simply
as something that can be grasped by the hand. “F5 and
AIP neurons only respond to certain features of objects
(their shape, size, inclination, etc.), and this selectivity is
significant in that these features are interpreted as just
as many systems of visual affordances and potential
motor acts. Whereas the neurons populating the lower
cerebral cortex areas code profiles, colours and wefts of
objects, processing the information selected in images
that, once memorised, would enable them to be recog-
nised in their visual features. But is this enough toresolve the anatomical distinction between the ventral
and dorsal routes in the functional opposition between
vision-for-perception and vision-for-action? We do not
think so – unless perception is reduced to an iconic rep-
resentation of objects, the portrayal of a thing, independ-
ent from any where or how, and action reduced to an
intention that discriminates between how and perhaps
where, but has nothing to do with what. Unless, that is,
the perceptive process is relegated to a mere identifica-
tion of figures (ideas, in the literal sense of the word),
corrected of any motor meaningfulness and raised to the
rank of single possible vehicles of meaning, and the
sense of the action broken up into a simple succession
of movements in themselves devoid of any objective cor-
relative” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2006, p. 49-50).
For the practical opportunities it enables this hypoth-
esis, on the basis of which any object proves knowable
and can therefore be conceptualised, highlights, on the
one hand, the inseparable link between perception and
action, and emphasises, on the other, how the act of per-
ceiving is not the result of a merely contemplative atti-
tude towards reality but the expression of an activity in
which the subject takes root in the environment by con-
stantly transforming it. This means placing design at
the base of perception, as its initial prerequisite, and
not as its final result, with a merely applicative, execu-
tive nature.
This conclusion is accredited and reinforced further by
the growing awareness that nowadays, as has rightly
been pointed out (Postman 1983), the reality we live in
is more and more marked by an exponential increase in
information and knowledge to the point of making us all
somewhat victims of a sort of cultural AIDS (Anti-Infor-
mation Deficiency Syndrome), due to the growing weak-
ness of any type of immune system against information.
The social and cultural structures which once acted as
powerful filters of the latter, selecting it, are gradually
losing their strength and effect: religion (in the sacred
text there is everything it is essential to know); the fam-
ily (with the tendency of parents to choose the commu-
nicative and expressive forms of their children, imposing
certain books and themes of conversation and forbidding
others); school (which constitutes the cultural tradition,
gives it shape, perpetuates it and conveys the contents
that each social system considers fundamental); science
(which, through the creation of schools, spreading of
manuals, and due to the effects of what Kuhn has called
“paradigms” on it, tends in each phase of its develop-
ment to provide a model of problems and solutions
acceptable by all those working in a certain field of re-
search), and so on. The result is the chaos of informa-
tion that nowadays is oppressing and suffocating us
from all sides and within which it is more and more dif-
ficult to find rules and a direction.
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and recording information has become more and more
simple and inexpensive. The enormous exchange of data
and the multiplication of active and passive support de-
vices (memories, networks, calculators, work stations and
databanks) made possible by the progress in information
and communication technologies offer an ever wider
spectrum of new communicative, cultural and aggregative
possibilities, with the formation of small and large com-
munities linked in networks that join up and dissolve in
the pursuit of a more or less lasting common interest.
This increasingly unconditional freedom of access to
information that risks producing the dilution and loss of
the sense of communication as an undesirable downside,
requires a capacity to select the information and know-
ledge available, which needs to be based - in order to be
carried out in a reasonable, effective and not purely
casual, inappropriate way - on a precise criterion of
pertinence. Since utterly pertinent/non pertinent cogni-
tive data or information do not exist, however, if this se-
lection is to be performed in the rigorous manner we
have suggested (which ought to be expected), it requires
preliminary reference to a problem to be tackled or pro-
ject to be worked out. It is only in relation to such a
problem/project, in actual fact, that we can reasonably
establish which information and which knowledge is
pertinent and useful and which not. If, therefore, for the
reasons explained, perception is to be understood more
and more as a selective capacity, it is solely through ex-
plicit reference to a problem or project that such a cap-
acity may be tangibly and properly manifested.
The meaning of this change of scenario becomes clear
if we refer to Gibson’s idea that objects, even the sim-
plest and most trivial, contain more than one affordance.
In the case of a common coffee-cup the visual affor-
dances offered to our motor system concern the handle,
central body, upper rim, etc. Consequently, observing it
“will determine the activation of several neural popula-
tions in the upper intraparietal area (UIA), each of which
codes a specific affordance. It is probable that these
“proposals” for action be sent to the F5 area, triggering
authentic potential motor acts. Now the choice of how
to act will not just depend on the intrinsic properties of
the object in question (shape, size, inclination, etc.) but
also on what we intend to do with it, and the use func-
tions we acknowledge it has, etc. In the case of the cup,
for example, we will grasp it in different ways depending
on whether we want to pick it up to drink coffee, rinse it
or, more simply, move it. And already in the first case
our grip may be different according to whether we are
afraid of being burnt, if there are any objects surround-
ing the cup, our habits, and whether we are inclined to
respect good manners, etc.” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
2006, p. 36).As regards the representation of space, which consti-
tutes the other cornerstone of “ecological” intelligence,
useful suggestions come to us from echographic findings
of the foetus’ behaviour in its mother’s uterus. After the
eighth week it already shows abundant targeted motor
activity, e.g. it moves its hand towards its face, while at
the sixth month it is able to put its hand in its mouth
and suck it – which demonstrates that before the child
is born it possesses motor representation of space. Once
born, its movements become more and more targeted,
based on the space surrounding its body, and this pro-
vides good evidence to support the idea, already put for-
ward by Ernst Mach and Jules-Henri Poincaré, of the
existence of a peripersonal space, coded in somatic coor-
dinates, i.e. processed in relation to the body and its
motor possibilities. As Poincaré writes, in fact, “it would
have been impossible for us to build” something like a
space “if we had not had an instrument for measuring it” –
an instrument to which we could “relate” each thing
and that we could use “instinctively”, namely our body:
“It is in relation to our body that we situate external ob-
jects, and the only relations of these objects that we can
represent to ourselves are their relations with our body”
(Poincaré 1989, p. 217).
So, peripersonal space is defined by Poincaré in terms
of the mutual coordination of the “many parries” made
possible by simply extending the arm: it is this extension
that enables us to determine the distinction between
near (everything that comes within the radius of action
outlined by it and therefore proves within range) and far
(everything that is beyond this range), and thus between
peripersonal and extrapersonal space. The distinction,
however, “is not defined once and for all, for the space it
marks out cannot be thought of as static but must be
conceived in a dynamic form. In other words, the dis-
tinction between near and far cannot be reduced to a
mere question of centimetres, as if our brain were calcu-
lating the distance that separates our body from objects
in absolute terms only. All this would not just contradict
that principle of relativity of space dear to Poincaré and
decisive for the body’s organisation of movements. The
actual organisation of F4 neuron receptive fields and
their anticipatory function with respect to contact with
the skin is not compatible with the idea of a rigidly, un-
ambiguously fixed peripersonal space”. And, in fact,
some experiments have shown how the visual receptive
fields of bimodal neurons in the posterior parietal cortex
of the monkey, which code hand movement in a similar
way to F4 neurons, may be modified by actions that en-
tail the use of instruments. After training some monkeys
to retrieve pieces of food with a small fork, researchers
“noted that during repeated use of the instrument the
visual receptive fields anchored to the hand expanded to
the point of including the internal space of the hand and
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incorporated in that of the hand. Whereas, when the
animal stopped using the instrument, though it still held
it in its hand, the receptive fields returned to their usual
range. The extension of the hand determined by the use
of the fork entailed widening of the space reachable by the
monkey, and therefore remodulation of near and far: the
neurons that became active in the presence of objects in
the peripersonal space also responded to stimuli that they
had not coded previously for they were far (namely outside
their space), but then, with the use of the fork, became
near” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2006, p. 71).
We may therefore say that if, in the light of the results
of the research we have referred to, objects appear more
and more like poles of virtual acts, space is defined by
the system of relations that these acts unfold, and which
finds its own proportion in the various parts of the body.
What we might call an ontology of relations thus takes
on a precise outline, within which the places of space
cannot be understood as positions having an autono-
mous meaning of their own, nor conceived as “objective
positions” in relation to a likewise presumed objective
position of our body, but need to be understood,
as Merleau-Ponty taught us, in their “inscribing around
us the variable range of our intentions or gestures”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1965, p. 199). The reference to inten-
tions highlights how we cognitively manage the world
surrounding us with mental operations, so that the ele-
ments of the real are for us no longer “things” but, as
has been seen, poles of possible operations that we can
carry out – correlated with possible interactions between
ourselves (our body) and the world. To interpret the
world in this key is to prefigure (almost pre-glimpse) all
the projects for action we could undertake on it, and
know how to combine, therefore, as we have said, sense
of reality and sense of possibility, managing to establish
that harmonic balance between these two senses which
Musil speaks of in Man without qualities:
“If the sense of reality exists, and no-one can doubt
that its existence is justified, then there must also be
something that we will call sense of possibility. Those
who have it do not say, for example: here this or that
happened, will happen, must happen, but imagine: here
this or that could or should happen. And if you tell them
something is what it is, they think: well, it could prob-
ably also be different. So that the sense of possibility
could also be defined as the capacity to imagine every-
thing that it could be, and not give greater importance
to what it is than to what it is not” (Musil, 1957, N° 12).
Seen from this viewpoint, the nature of design, how-
ever it is intended and defined and whatever process is
applied to it, becomes the expression of a continuous
wager that must take into account, obviously, the ties
placed by reality, but also remain open to a spectrum ofpossibilities with which to play, thus avoiding falling into
the trap of one-sided exaltation of the ties to the
detriment of the system of opportunities that should
remain available once these have been defined and
fixed.
Social intelligence
Another interesting aspect that has already arisen from
the discovery of mirror neurons is the possible reference
to a capacity based on precise neuron mechanisms in an
observer, to “translate” on the spot the body perspective
of a person observed carrying out a particular action.
This means that to bring about this translation we have
absolutely no need of “dictionary” mediation consisting
of mental pictures, as classical cognitivism suggested,
conceiving the mind as a functional system whose pro-
cesses can be described as manipulations of information
symbols based on a series of formal syntax rules. It was
from this approach that the idea consequently sprang
that pictures are intrinsically symbolic and that thought
should be reduced to a merely computational process.
To thoroughly clarify the difference between the two
approaches an example might be useful. If I see someone
in a bar move their hand towards a tankard of beer, I
will immediately understand that he is about to sip the
drink. The crucial point is: how do I do it? According to
the classical cognitive approach, to reach this conclusion
I have to necessarily translate the sensory information
relating to the gesture of the person I am observing into
a series of mental pictures sharing the same prepos-
itional format with language: in the case in point, these
pictures will concern the other person’s desire to drink
beer, his beliefs concerning the fact that the tankard he
is about to grasp is actually full of this drink, and his
intention to lift the glass to his mouth to drink. The dis-
covery of mirror neurons enables us, on the other hand,
to say that observation of an action causes the activation
of the same neural circuit in charge of controlling its
execution; observation of the action therefore induces
automatic simulation of that same action in the observer,
and, through this, his understanding. As D. Stern wrote,
“our nervous systems have been constructed to be cap-
tured by the nervous systems of others, to such an ex-
tent that we can feel and have the experiences of others
as if we were in their skin and in the same way as if we
were within our own skin” (Stern, 2004, p. 76).
We can therefore understand the meaning of others’
behaviour precisely because our brain has the possibility
and capacity to create models of this behaviour in the
same immediate, automatic way in which it creates
models of our own. The final result of this modelling
process puts us in a position to understand and predict
the consequences of others’ action just as it enables us
to understand and predict our own behaviour. The
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based on is the same.
An important consequence of this illustration is that it
is impossible for us to know other people and in particu-
lar what they do independently from ourselves without
relating to our body and its movements. “Another’s real-
ity” cannot be known as such, but only in close relation
to the subject perceiving, observing and interacting with
it. From this point of view an interesting hypothesis was
put forward by Gallese, one of the members of the
Parma team to whom we owe the discovery of mirror
neurons, who predicted “the existence of ‘somatosen-
sory’ mirror neurons that might contribute to giving
us the capacity to identify the different body parts of
others, basing them on the same parts of our own body”
(Gallese, 2003, p. 39).
This hypothesis was actually confirmed by the results
of experiments carried out by Gallese himself in collab-
oration with other colleagues (Keysers et al. 2004), which
showed that the experience of being touched on a part
of one’s body determines activation of the same neural
circuit as that activated when we observe someone else
being touched on the same part of the body. The cortical
region involved is the SII/PV area, located in the parietal
operculum, commonly considered an exclusively tactile
area. The same cortical region is therefore activated both
when we experience in first person a tactile sensation
located in a part of our body, and when we witness a
similar sensory feeling experienced by someone else.
These results lead us to consider subjectivity as a
process that develops within the sphere of inter-subject-
ivity and in which the relationship with another is con-
stitutive and fundamental. As Bakhtin writes in his book
Estetika slovesnogo tvorčestva (Aesthetics of literary cre-
ation), which appeared in 1979, and was published in
Italian under the title L’autore e l’eroe, “among the values
of the internal world, there is no value that aesthetically
expresses my body and my soul and their organic artistic
unity in the integral man; my body and soul are not built
up within the horizon of my own activity, so my horizon
cannot calmly close itself up and surround me like an
outline of myself endowed with value. […] In all aes-
thetic forms the organising force is made up of the
other’s category of values and our relationship with the
other, one that is enriched by the excess of value my
view has of the other and that enables transgredient ful-
filment” (Bakhtin, 1988, pp. 169-170).
Therefore, as Bakhtin also emphasises in his Problems
of Dostoievski’s Poetics, each individual that has existed
in time is, and cannot but be, a fundamentally open sys-
tem, so that the relationship with another is in itself a
constitutive element of his being: “Not the analysis of
consciousness in the form of a single, unitary I, but ana-
lysis of the interaction of many consciousnessesendowed with equal rights and full value. A single con-
sciousness lacks self-sufficiency and cannot exist. I be-
come aware of myself and become myself only by
revealing myself to another, through another and by
another. The most important acts that constitute self-
awareness are determined by the relationship with
another’s consciousness (with the you). Detachment, dis-
unity, withdrawing into one’s shell as the principal cause
of loss of self. Not what happens inside, but what hap-
pens at the border of one’s own and another’s conscious-
ness, on the threshold. And everything that is internal is
not self-sufficient but is addressed outwards and be-
comes a dialogue: each internal experience reaches the
border, meets others and in this encounter full of ten-
sion lies all its substance. It is a higher degree of sociality
(neither external, nor concerning things, nor internal).
In this Dostoievski opposes all decadent and idealist
(individualist) culture and the culture of radical, hopeless
solitude. He asserts the impossibility of solitude, the illu-
sory nature of solitude. The existence of man (both ex-
ternal and internal) is very deep communication. To be
means to communicate. Absolute death (not being) is
the impossibility to be heard, recognised and remem-
bered. To be means to be for others and, through others,
for the self. Man does not have a sovereign internal ter-
ritory, but is always and ever at the edge, and, looking
into himself, he looks into the eyes of another and with
the eyes of another” (Bakhtin, 1988, pp. 323-324).
The relationship of otherness is therefore inherent in
the I, in that it is discovered within the subject, and is it-
self a dialogue, an I/other relation, the identity of which
is formed in the border space, in the intermediate world
between the self and another and between the self and
external reality as a whole.
Temporal intelligence
What we call “temporal intelligence” is generally con-
nected with the traditional linear conception of history,
hinged on the idea of time as Xρόνος, the name of the
god that symbolised the mechanical measurement of
time, which led to time being perceived as flowing in a
single direction, from past to future, following the
rhythms of life and divided into a “before” and an “after”,
all in all homogeneous.
From the classical tradition, however, we inherited
other conceptions of time, more suitable to the enhance-
ment of design and the capacities it requires. First of all,
there is the idea of time as Kαιρός, the need and capacity
to seize opportunities that arise on the scene and rapidly
fade away if we do not know how to grasp them. A con-
cept of time, therefore, that presupposes the ability to
find and maintain the right distance between, on the one
hand, thought and action and, on the other, reality, for
innovation and transformation to be able to take place.
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not be too close, in order to avoid thought and action
being overthrown by the course of events and effectual-
ity reaching maturity and fulfilment, nor, however, too
distant, to avoid them ending up losing contact with
the “potential of the situation” and leaving the field of
possibilities that arise, thus risking not being ready to
seize them. Posidippus defines Kαιρός as “pandamator”,
namely he who prevails over everything: he is on tip-toe,
has double wings, holds a razor in his right hand, with
his hair over his face and his neck bare. These are the
features Posidippus picked out in Lysippos’ statue, which
translated into successful iconographic terms the idea of
the right moment that has to be grasped as soon as it
comes to us, otherwise it will be impossible to grasp -
that same impossibility to grasp the propitious moment
that has irremediably passed which in Lysippean iconog-
raphy translates into Kαιρός, with no hair as a handhold.
In The Nicomachean Ethics (1096a 27) Kαιρός is the def-
inition of the good of time precisely because “action
should therefore be based on Kαιρός as the suitable mo-
ment, i.e. should grasp the right time when it is ripe and
decide upon action”.
To speak of “suitable, right time” means to refer to
the effort and objective of gaining advantage from cir-
cumstances and occasions, i.e. it indicates the patience
of waiting for the situation to evolve so as to seize
favourable developments and be able to find all the op-
portunities that might arise in circumstances as they de-
velop, with the purpose of gaining advantage from them.
The term Kαιρός thus expresses a notion of qualitative
time, and not prevalently quantitative like Xρόνος, linked
with the conviction that for each thing a moment of
completeness and fulfilment exists. It describes the opti-
mal moment for each thing, the culminating point but
above all the decisional space for an action that aims to
succeed and therefore achieve its own telos.
But there is a possible alternative etymological origin
of this idea of time that makes its distinctive traits
emerge with greater efficacy. This is the idea of time as
καîρος, a term belonging to the art of weaving. Weaving,
time and fate were ideas that were often linked. An
opening in the weft of fate might mean a gap in time,
an eternal moment in which the design becomes more
compact or relaxed: the weaver pushes the shuttle and
bobbin through the opening in the threads of the weft at
the critical moment, the right moment, for the gap in
the weft only has limited time and the shuttle must be
pushed while the gap is open.
Finally, again in the ancient world, in Greek philoso-
phy in particular, there is a clear reference to another
type of “temporal intelligence”, based on a conception of
time not consisting just of the capacity to mark out ‘be-
coming’ and seize opportunities but also on a sense ofpermanency and continuity that has a dual nature: the
experiential nature of each single individual and the one
we define nowadays as phylogenetic-species specific,
which underlies the simultaneous feeling of individual
uniqueness/privacy and universality. This conception of
time hinges on the awareness that personal memory is
solidly attached to the “collective memory” at the foun-
dations of culture and re-proposes it, confirming and
moulding it continually. The connection and interaction
between this dimension of collective memory and the
overall experience of each single person in the “here”
and “now” in which they live are characterised and
marked by the time of permanency, Aἰών, which guaran-
tees continuity between the different generations - what
Arthur Lovejoy calls “the great chain of being” (Lovejoy,
1966). The contents archived in the individual mind –
events, facts, concepts and capacities – are precisely for
this reason something more than the representation of a
single, unique personality. They are also the crucial
point of transmission of culture. Time as Aἰών is the ac-
tive subject of this transmission, the base on which it
rests and what makes each one of us a “transmission
belt” of the inheritance of the past and the centre of pro-
jects of the history of the future.
But besides this eternal, unchanging Aἰών that is be-
yond time, there is another type, however, that becomes
real in the world and enables “duration” - the birth,
growth and then the end of each process of manifestation.
On the temporal plane this cannot but be expressed as
past, present and future, while at the symbolic level it
becomes Aἰών that is initially the boy, then the adult
and finally the old man. These are indeed the best-
known portrayals of the god Aἰών, represented as a boy
not only in rituals but even in the first Hellenic concep-
tion (Heraclitus, then Euripides).
The Aἰών symbol expressed through the three funda-
mental ages that mark out the moments of a cosmic
cycle is found again, significantly, in the House of Aἰών
mosaic in Antioch, dating back to halfway through the
Third Century A.D. This mosaic stands out for a par-
ticular detail: it depicts a symposium or triclinium where
four male figures are shown lying on klinai. The figure
on the left, a mature though not elderly man with a
beard and moustache, wearing a garland of leaves and
holding the Zodiac wheel in his right hand, rests on an-
other kline, of which only the headpiece can be seen. He
is looking towards his left at three individuals facing for-
wards and lying on a kline. Next to the figure on the left
lying on the bed of which only the headpiece is seen, the
word aion appears, while next to the three figures on
the couch facing forwards three words can be read re-
spectively: mellon (future), enestos (present) and finally
parochemenos (past). Moreover, between the bed-head
on the left and the trapezion (table) another inscription
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the three male figures seen from the front. The strangest
aspect of the portrayal in mosaic that naturally makes
the interpretation more interesting is finding aion and
chronoi together. This cannot but bring to mind – also
for chronological issues – the title of Plotinus’ Enneads,
Treatise III 7, On Eternity and Time, in which he attri-
butes the temporality of duration to the Soul, this hypos-
tasis being more in contact with the sensible world, and
atemporal eternity to the nous. Significantly Plotinus
writes (Enn., III 7 7-8) that to investigate time one must
descend (katabateon) from eternity. At the chronological
level of Plotinus and probably also of the Antioch mo-
saic the meaning of aion was widely stabilised: in effect,
by this term was meant, on the one hand, eternity as op-
posed to the durative aspects of temporality, and on the
other, as perhaps was the case of the mosaic in question,
eternity defined in the duration of time, past, present
and future.
The presence of these mixed, hybrid forms authorises
and may give credit to a hypothesis of some interest,
namely they might constitute the necessary reference
base for conceptually framing those particular forms of
experience that, though fitting into determinate time
and a specific phase of becoming, manage to cross the
barriers of the immediate and the present, to fit into that
atemporal dimension that is determined precisely by the
capacity to place oneself outside the incessant flow of in-
stants, so as to experiment a sort of suspension of the
rhythm of time. It is exactly this that gives emotions that
kind of imprint of eternity thanks to which they open a
breach in time and endure, managing to pass from one
generation to another.
We are obviously referring to that type of perception
that constitutes the opportunity, motivation and kind of
experimentation to rise to the dimension of art, some-
thing that can be likened to an “interruption in time”, an
experience of “absorbed, intransitive attention” - a sort
of “out of time within time”, a breath of eternity in the
experience of life. This type of perception presupposes
the capacity to isolate a single instant (one in which a
significant experience takes place) and “condense” past,
present and future in it, subtracting it from the rhythm of
time and thus introducing into the latter a break which, as
Giorgio Agamben writes “seems to introduce a split or
halt in this eternal flow” (Agamben, 1984, pp. 150-151).
Reference to this rich, articulate analysis of time is
more important and topical than ever, given that, as we
said at the beginning, a cultural perspective is still in
force and dominant that proceeds according to the logic
of immediate, brief time and follows the strict dynamics
of before and after (Xρόνος). The speed of change and
innovation nowadays, however, requires more and more
reference to time as the capacity to seize opportunities,establishing the right distance between thought and ac-
tion (καιρός). But innovation now comes from several
different sources and the growing success of the open,
widespread idea of governance, opposing the oligarchic,
hierarchical one of government, involves reference to
several subjects, both institutional and social, so that the
idea of synchronisation and “weaving” between different
impulses, wishes and decisional levels is decisive. In this
case καιρός becomes fundamental, an idea of time in
greater harmony with governance, which is a dynamic
process and a normative, regulatory idea. The impossi-
bility to define specific confines within it makes games
devoid of well-defined lines of demarcation and actors
that are not all defined and certified beforehand. The
consequence is the need to keep the co-presence of what
is systemic and extrasystemic, structural and extrastruc-
tural, and to know how to “weave them together”, since
the extrasystemic/extrastructural components function
more and more as a reserve of energy and creativity
from which to draw to give new impulse, dynamism and
creativity to the system. Subsidiarity relations, partner-
ships, systematic negotiations and contracted policies
should be set up, but cannot be shut up in local govern-
ment politics. Strategic plans, not by chance, are
relaunched onto several generations and open up the fu-
ture; they have necessarily to take into account not just
the balance between local and opening up to the global,
but also opening up to time as duration, to Aἰών in all
its extension and duration.
“Double vision”
What we have called “contextually bound flexibility”,
made up, as we have seen, of “roots”, “wings”, “inhabit-
ing” strongly rooted in the context one belongs to, with
its territorial, historic, cultural and social specificities,
and a vocation for migration, for launching oneself into
a different space from that of our everyday experience,
needs, in order to develop adequately, to be based on a
type of vision of which Giacomo Leopardi left us an ex-
emplary analysis: “To the sensitive, imaginative man, liv-
ing, as I did for a long period, continuously feeling and
imagining, the world and objects are in a certain sense
double. Through his eyes he will see a tower, the coun-
tryside; with his ears he will hear the sound of a bell; at
the same time, with his imagination he will see a differ-
ent tower and different countryside, and will hear a dif-
ferent sound. All that is beautiful and pleasant in things
lies in this second kind of object. Sad is that life (and it
frequently is, too) that does not see or hear or feel, ex-
cept for simple objects, just those of which his eyes, ears
and other senses receive sensations” (Leopardi 1997, 30
November).
A secondary image thus unfolds, capable of opening
up deeper and wider horizons and stimulating the mind’s
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compared with the usual, dominant patterns.
On the grounds of this profound intuition of Leopardi’s,
it is not just acceptable but dutiful to conclude that the en-
vironment in which we live inexorably decays and grows
ugly if we remain prisoners of a gaze that “sees without
feeling” and, devoid as it is of any ability to imagine, levels
out reality as it appears to lazy eyes and a perceptive struc-
ture incapable of expressing and producing that “second
image” of which Leopardi speaks (Leopardi 1997).
Leopardi’s deep insight, which also clarifies the sense
of the quotation from Wittgenstein at the beginning of
this article, has received interesting confirmation in the
model of information processing in three stages, each of
which transforms and enriches the previous one, which
contemporary neuroscientists have developed as regards
visual perception, in the wake of David Marr’s pioneer-
ing work (Marr 1982).
These stages have been summarised as follows by Erik
K. Kandel: “The first stage, which begins in the retina, is
the low-level visual processing studied by Kuffler. This
stage establishes the features of a particular visual scene,
singling out the position of an object in space and iden-
tifying its colour.
The second stage, which begins in the primary cortex, is
the intermediate level of visual processing described by
Hubel and Wiesel and by Zeki. It assembles simple linear
segments, each aligned in a specific direction, obtaining
outlines that define the borders of an image, and builds up
coherent perception of the shape of an object. This
process is called outline integration. At the same time the
intermediate level of sight separates the object from the
background in a process called surface segmentation. Low-
and intermediate-level processing together identify as
figures the areas of the image that are linked with an ob-
ject and as background the areas that are not […].
The third stage, high-level visual processing, which
spreads along the primary visual cortex to the lower
temporal cortex, establishes categories and meanings.
Here the brain integrates the visual information with
relevant information coming from a variety of other
sources, and enables us to recognise specific objects,
faces and scenes” (Kandel, 2012).
Of these two phases, that of intermediate-level visual
processing is considered particularly demanding for it
requires that the primary visual cortex determine which
segments belong to a single object and which are com-
ponents of other objects in the context of an overall vis-
ual scene, composed of hundreds or even thousands of
segments of lines.
Here the decisive importance of the outline as a line of
demarcation can be seen. Studies on the methods of or-
ganisation of the visual world of all species able to focus
light to form images actually show that these methodsmust, however, be characterised by the presence of seg-
regated figures, clearly distinct against the background.
Given the properties of light, there are few ways of
obtaining this. One, a very general way, is to obtain mar-
gins or edges where physical stimulation reveals differ-
ences. The problem is of course that in many
circumstances these physical variations may not be very
clear, if not indistinct, or may just be present in parts
(think of an animal moving among thick foliage). And
so, by means of natural selection, interpolation mecha-
nisms have been perfected, which, using quite simple
rules based on the statistical regularities of the environ-
ment (similarity in colour, clarity and texture, continuity
of direction, common movement of parts, etc.), extract
edges and lines of demarcation for the use and con-
sumption of the animal that needs them.
This is exactly why “our brain cells are very good at
reading lines and profiles as edges. The brain integrates
simple lines to form the edges differentiating a figure
from the background. Whenever our eyes are open,
orientation cells in the primary visual cortex are con-
structing the elements of the picture of the scene before
us. Moreover, the primary visual cortex uses the inhibi-
tory regions of the perceptive fields of those neurons to
accentuate the border lines of the image” (Kandel, 2012
pp. 272-273).
This tendency to pick out margins and lines of demar-
cation is so strong that living organisms tend to see such
lines even where they do not physically exist, like in the
famous figures of Kanizsa. We are referring to situations
in which we find ourselves faced with an unusual figure
that in actual fact is not there, even though it is seen,
and “seeing the invisible” is the tangible expression and
proof of the fact that we need a border that separates
and distinguishes figure and background; we need it to
such a degree that even if this border is not physically
there, we are steered towards perceiving it just the same.
In these cases, then, the border takes shape as an edge, a
line of demarcation that enables the visual scene to be
divided up according to the rules of the figure/back-
ground game.
Researchers studying the brain have discovered some
thirty centres that, as well as the primary visual cortex,
continue the task of analysing and isolating, or segregat-
ing, information on shape, colour, movement and depth.
The information coming from all these specialised areas
is segregated and conveyed separately to the higher cog-
nitive regions of the brain, including the prefrontal cor-
tex, where it is finally coordinated in unitary, identifiable
perception.
The low- and intermediate-level processing stages are
carried out together and mostly follow a bottom-up
course based on principles studied by the Gestaltists,
such as the proximity of the linear segments that form
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and orientation, and good continuity, according to which
in a figure the segments of a line will usually be oriented
and grouped together in such a way that the edges con-
tinue in the “smoothest” way possible.
High-level visual processing is top-down. It produces
inferences and controls hypotheses comparing them
with the visual images remembered, of which it has pre-
viously had experience, and thus leads to aware visual
perception and interpretation of meaning, which is
nevertheless not perfect and may lead to errors.
Top-down re-evaluation operates following four principles:
a) Neglecting the details that are not behaviourally
relevant in a given context;
b) Looking for their constancy;
c) Trying to draw out the essential, constant features
of objects, people and landscapes;
d) And, finally, something particularly important,
comparing the present image with images
encountered in the past.
These biological results confirm that sight is not sim-
ply a window on the world, but really is the result of
active processing by the brain. As the cognitive psych-
ologist Chris Frith writes: “What I perceive are not the
rough, ambiguous suggestions that reach my eyes, ears
and fingers from the outside world. I perceive something
much richer, an image that combines all these rough sig-
nals with an enormous quantity of past experiences. Our
perception of the world is a fantasy that coincides with
reality” (Frith, 2009, p. 167).
All these findings seem to confirm the fact that cre-
ative work requires priority reference to the original
sphere of the possible, with its almost unlimited oppor-
tunities, from which a “top-down” route develops, which
leads, following a tenacious, constant effort of selection
and narrowing down, to the system of ties dictated and
imposed by adherence to effectuality, namely to the real
which appears to us “here” and “now”.
Deduction, induction and abduction
These results reinforce the doubts and bewilderment
already pointed out in the first paragraph as regards the
idea that we may speak of a “mechanism of discovery”,
and also therefore of project-oriented processing based
entirely on an inductive process.
Induction, as is known, gives rise to “Hume’s prob-
lem”, which Kant also came up against, and from which
the “Copernican revolution” sprang, carried out by him
in The Critique of Pure Reason. This consists of trying
to understand how we move from a multiplicity of ob-
servations to a theory that enables the behaviour of na-
ture to be envisaged. Is the inductive procedure correctand scientifically reliable, Hume wondered, when it au-
thorises us to pass from many specific cases to one gen-
eral statement? Hume’s typical example was this: how
can we be certain that the Sun will rise tomorrow based
on the fact that each day past experience has taught us
that the Sun does rise? Is there a reason why the future
must necessarily resemble the past? The answer he pro-
vided was sceptical: induction is not a reliable instru-
ment for seeking truth, in that it is based on an unjust
transformation of temporal succession (post hoc) into a
causal link (propter hoc). Nevertheless, man is led to “be-
lieve” in induction (beliefs of the type “tomorrow the
Sun will rise”) because he is guided by habit. Something
I have very often seen happen leads me to believe that I
will see it happen again.
Bertrand Russell presented a particularly witty, pun-
gent variation of the problem. Think of an American
turkey that is fed every day. At each meal its conviction
is consolidated that one of the general rules of life is that
it will be fed daily by friendly members of the human
race who think only of its welfare. Its faith gains strength
gradually as the number of meals administered to it
grows, and each day the idea that it is in a friendly envir-
onment is corroborated. As the days pass and its death
grows nearer and nearer, the turkey feels more and more
secure. Its sense of security, therefore, reaches a max-
imum just at the moment when risk becomes greatest.
This is the trouble and the paradoxical aspect of induc-
tion: learning backwards, trusting in the uniformity of
the course of nature and experience, and in the impossi-
bility of a radical change. Then, however, in view of
Thanksgiving, the turkey experiences something totally
unexpected: it is strangled in order to be cooked.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) suggested a “third
way” compared with the two processes and instruments
for thinking that we have so far taken into consideration.
Particularly interested in understanding what scientific
method consisted of and its features, he tried to recon-
struct the way the scientist reasons in his scientific work.
To this end he developed the philosophy of science in
his theory on inference, in which by inference we should
understand not a series of mental processes – in actual
fact, from the psychological point of view we may arrive
at a theory from the most unexpected ways – but the set
of types of scientific reasoning and kinds of justification
that can be offered for them. On this matter he distin-
guished three different fundamental ways of reasoning:
deduction, induction and retroduction (usually translated
by abduction). Deduction is reasoning that, if used cor-
rectly, cannot lead from true premises to a false conclu-
sion; given the truth of the premises, the truth of the
conclusion must necessarily follow. The need for deductive
reasoning depends on the fact that it is not exposed to pos-
sible empirical confutation. Deductive reasoning, logical
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verse. Induction, on the other hand, is that kind of reason-
ing by which one concludes that facts similar to those
observed are true in cases not examined. Thus, for ex-
ample, from the fact that all swans observed up to now
have proved to be white, it appears legitimate to conclude
that other swans will also be white. In Peirce’s opinion,
abduction (or retroduction or hypothetic reasoning)
should be taken into consideration as well as deduction
and induction. The differences existing between induction
and abduction are basically two: in the first place, in in-
duction we conclude, as stated, that facts similar to those
observed are true in cases not examined, while in hypo-
thetic reasoning or abduction we reach the conclusion
that a fact exists that is completely different from any
other observed up to now; in the second place we can see
that while induction classifies, abduction explains. The
pattern of reasoning by abduction is as follows:
1. We observe C, a surprising fact.
2. But if A were true, then C would be natural.
3. There is, therefore, reason to suspect that A is true.
What is thus being maintained is that a certain conjec-
ture (or hypothesis), i.e. that A is true, is worth taking
into consideration. We therefore see that abduction is
the fruit of the scientist’s inventive, creative moment, of
the fortunate instant of scientific inventiveness that for-
mulates generalised explicative hypotheses, which, if con-
firmed, become scientific laws (though still able to be
corrected and substituted) while, if falsified, are rejected.
And it is indeed abduction that makes scientific and
technological thought progress, conveyed forward on the
one hand by the progressive incorporation of new, un-
suspected facts that therefore stimulate the invention of
new hypotheses able to explain them and, on the other,
by an axiomatic unification of laws, implemented by
what are called the great simple ideas.
Henri Poincaré had already ingeniously understood
this when over a century ago he observed on the subject
of the scientist’s behaviour, with originality and a cap-
acity for foresight that still do not cease to amaze us
today, that when the scientist finds himself faced with
data and observations that constitute the material of his
work, he should “not acknowledge so much the similar-
ities and differences, as, rather, single out the affinities
hidden under apparent discrepancies. The particular
rules seem at first sight discordant but, on looking
closer, we realise that they are usually similar; although
presenting material differences, they resemble each other
in the shape and order of their parts. Considering them
from this standpoint, we will see them extend and tend
to become all-embracing. And it is this that gives value
to certain facts that link up to complete a whole,showing how it is the faithful image of other sets already
known. I do not want to go further with this; these few
words are enough to show that the man of science does
not choose the facts he must observe by chance […]. He
tends rather to concentrate a lot of experience and much
thought in a slim space, and this is why a small physics
book contains so much past experience and a number of
possible experiences a thousand times greater, the results
of which we already know” (Poincaré, 1997, pp. 14-15).
The man of science does not, therefore, proceed by
piling up and hoarding facts and data or acting on the
sum of them, but by intersection and interlocking, find-
ing bridges and analogies under the diversities that
appear that are not detectable by an untrained, non-
expert eye. In this way he manages to establish links,
transfer and superimpose so that he is able to consider-
ably reduce the volume of experiences, both effectively
achieved and simply possible, which he has available.
According to Peirce, however, though acknowledging
the priority and specific function carried out by the
process of hypothetic inference, we need to realise that
abduction is closely connected with deduction and induc-
tion. It is so in the sense that, having to judge the ac-
ceptability of the hypothesis, it will be necessary for each
true, plausible hypothesis to be such that consequences
can be deduced from it which, in their turn, may be in-
ductively tested, namely by experiments. Furthermore, in
his opinion, this dependency does not have a one-sided
nature, since he considers induction above all a method
for testing conclusions, and he believes these conclusions
are always suggested, in the first place, by hypothetic infer-
ence. With induction consequences are generalised and
tested that can be deduced from a given hypothesis; thus,
the reciprocal dependency of these two forms of inference
and their common dependency on deduction prove to be
equally clear. In other words, we cover the world and the
myriad facts composing it with hypotheses or conjectures
of a general nature in order to understand, foresee and
manipulate them, and from these we can deduce unusual
propositions that, if verified, will confirm those hypoth-
eses, which will then pass on to the rank of laws, though
always revisable.
So here we have reached, in conclusion and on the
grounds this time of a path of discussion, the idea that
project-oriented capacity - precisely because it requires
the possession of, and capacity to correctly manage, the
entire register of “instruments for thinking” that we have
available, given that as well as deduction, induction and
abduction it presupposes the current use also of analysis,
abstraction and analogy – may only be developed, as
already mentioned, on the basis of an itinerary of deep,
complete enhancement of the designer as a person and
of his specific skills, capacities and knowledge. It is in
this sense that the idea concisely expressed in the title of
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design is to design oneself”. Between the two moments
of personal growth and designing “tangled recursivity”
exists, of the type Hofstadter speaks of in his book
Gödel, Escher, Bach, basing it on the following conjec-
ture: “recursive systems sufficiently complex to possess
the strength necessary to evade all pre-established pat-
terns might exist. And is this not perhaps one of the
properties that define intelligence? Instead of simply con-
sidering programmes as composed of recursive procedures
able to call up themselves, why not make a real effort
and invent programmes able to modify themselves: pro-
grammes able to act on programmes, extend, improve and
repair them, and so on?” (Hofstadter, 1994, p. 165).
Read in this key, between designing and designing
oneself a relation is configured by means of which the
first process is developed and becomes manifest through
the second, which, in turn, grows and progresses thanks
also to the internal resources acquired and enriched by
commitment to the exercise of the art of designing how-
ever understood.
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